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ABSTRACT
Today, large amounts of valuable data are distributed among mil-
lions of user-held devices, such as personal computers, phones, or
Internet-of-things devices. Many companies collect such data with
the goal of using it for training machine learning models allowing
them to improve their services. User-held data is, however, often
sensitive, and collecting it is problematic in terms of privacy. We
address this issue by proposing a novel way of training a supervised
classifier in a distributed setting akin to the recently proposed feder-
ated learning paradigm, but under the stricter privacy requirement
that the server that trains the model is assumed to be untrusted
and potentially malicious. We thus preserve user privacy by design,
rather than by trust. In particular, our framework, called secret
vector machine (SecVM), provides an algorithm for training linear
support vector machines (SVM) in a setting in which data-holding
clients communicate with an untrusted server by exchanging mes-
sages designed to not reveal any personally identifiable information.
We evaluate our model in two ways. First, in an offline evaluation,
we train SecVM to predict user gender from tweets, showing that
we can preserve user privacy without sacrificing classification per-
formance. Second, we implement SecVM’s distributed framework
for the Cliqz web browser and deploy it for predicting user gender
in a large-scale online evaluation with thousands of clients, out-
performing baselines by a large margin and thus showcasing that
SecVM is suitable for production environments.
ACM Reference Format:
Valentin Hartmann, Konark Modi, Josep M. Pujol, and Robert West. 2020.
Privacy-Preserving Classification with Secret Vector Machines. In Proceed-
ings of the 29th ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge
Management (CIKM ’20), October 19–23, 2020, Virtual Event, Ireland. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3340531.3412051
1 INTRODUCTION
With the growing number of smartphones, intelligent cars and
smart home devices, the amount of highly valuable data that is
spread among many devices increases at a rapid pace. Those de-
vices are typically in possession of end users and so is the data
produced by and stored on them. Of course companies are inter-
ested in making use of this data, e.g., to detect usage patterns, make
better-informed business decisions, and ultimately improve their
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products. As an example, consider the case of a web browser ven-
dor wanting to infer demographics from users’ browsing histories
in order to automatically change the default behavior for hiding
adult-only content from users inferred to be minors, or to show
relevant website suggestions to users based on their inferred age
groups.
The classical way of building the necessary prediction model
would be to collect the users’ data on a central server and then
run a machine learning algorithm on it. But this comes with severe
disadvantages. First, the user has to put the necessary trust in
the data-collecting entity. Even in case of trust, the relationship
between the two parties is very imbalanced; new regulations such as
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
[11] and e-privacy frameworks try to rebalance the relationship
to be more fair. But still, even in the case of perfect regulation,
the collection of user data incurs a privacy risk. There are many
ways in which privacy could be compromised: hacks leading to
a data breach [38], disgruntled or unethical employees that use
the data for their own benefit [9], companies going bankrupt and
selling the data as assets [31], and of course government-issued
subpoenas and backdoors [15, 28]. All in all, it is safe to assume
that gathering users’ data puts their privacy at risk, regardless of
the comprehensiveness of the data management policies in place.
It is thus desirable to be able to build prediction models without
learning any personally identifying information about the individ-
ual users whose data is used in the training process. For instance,
the party who is training the model should not be able to infer
labels or feature values of individual users. This requirement im-
mediately precludes us from using the standard machine learning
setup, where feature vectors for all users are stored in a feature
matrix, labels in a label vector, and an optimization algorithm is
then used to find the model parameters that minimize a given loss
function.
The issue with the vanilla machine learning setup is that the
party training the model sees all data—features and labels—at the
same time, which typically makes it easy to infer user identities,
even if the data is pseudo-anonymized, i.e., if actual user ids have
been replaced with random identifiers. One way to achieve this is
by tying together multiple features associated with the same user,
as was the case with the now-infamous AOL data breach, where
users thought to be anonymized were identified by analyzing all
their search queries together [5]. Moreover, user privacy can also
be compromised by correlating the pseudo-anonymized data with
external datasets, which was done with the Netflix movie rating
dataset [29].
A recently proposed way forward is given by the paradigm of
federated learning [24]. Here, model fitting does not happen locally
on the machines of a single party; rather, it works on distributed
data without the need for central aggregation. In essence, feder-
ated learning models perform gradient descent in a distributed way,
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where, instead of sharing their raw data with the server that is build-
ing the model, clients only share the gradient updates necessary to
improve the loss function locally for their personal data.
While this is a promising approach, it was not originally designed
with the goal of preserving privacy. Later extensions have addressed
this issue, by injecting random noise into the data on the client-side
before sending it to the server [2] or by using cryptography [6].
Present work: Secret vectormachines (SecVM). This work pro-
poses a novel and different approach to training a supervised ma-
chine learning classifier in a privacy-preserving manner. Crucially,
in our setup, the server is assumed to be untrusted, i.e., potentially
malicious. Our key observation is that support vector machines
(SVM), a popular machine learning model, are particularly well-
suited for privacy-preserving classification, due to the hinge loss
function used in its objectives: when features and labels are bi-
nary (as is often the case), the SVM gradient can only take on the
three discrete values −1, 0, and 1, which means particularly little
information about the client is revealed.
Starting from this observation, we identify additional ingredi-
ents necessary to maintain user privacy and design a distributed
protocol for training SVMs. We term our algorithm secret vector ma-
chine (SecVM). As in the federated learning setup [24], the SecVM
model is trained on the server side in collaboration with the data-
owning clients. What sets SecVM apart from prior proposals for
privacy-preserving federated learning [13, 25] is that it assumes an
untrusted server and works without adding random noise. Instead,
it leverages the above observation regarding the SVM loss and
makes the recovery of the original data from the updates shared by
clients impossible by means of feature hashing, splitting updates
into small chunks, and sending them to the server according to a
particular communication protocol. Other popular classification
algorithms such as logistic regression or neural networks do not
share the property of SVM of having an integer-valued gradient,
and are therefore not suited for preserving privacy in our setting.
Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows.
• We propose secret vector machines (SecVM), a novel method
for training linear SVM classifiers with integer features in
a privacy-preserving manner (Sec. 3 and 4).
• In an offline evaluation, we apply SecVM to a large dataset
of tweets in order to infer users’ gender from the words
contained in their tweets, showing that we can maintain
user privacy without lowering classification performance,
compared to a vanilla SVM model (Sec. 5).
• We implement SecVM’s client–server setup for the Cliqz
web browser [1] and successfully deploy it in a large-scale
online evaluation with thousands of participating clients,
outperforming baselines on a gender prediction task by a
large margin and thus demonstrating the feasibility of our
model in production settings (Sec. 6).
By exploiting specific properties of support vector machines, our
method overcomes the shortcomings of other classification models
in a privacy-preserving context (cf. discussion in Sec. 7 for details).
Moreover, due to their good performance on various classification
tasks, SVMs are of high practical relevance for both researchers as
well as industry practitioners, with recent applications in material
sciences [39], geology [7], remote sensing [19] and medicine [17,
23, 37] — the latter being a particularly privacy-sensitive area. Also,
although our exposition considers binary labels, it can readily be
extended to the multi-class case, via schemes such as one-vs.-one
or one-vs.-all [16].
2 RELATEDWORK
There are two main approaches to the problem of extracting infor-
mation while at the same time protecting privacy. In the first, an
altered version of the data is released. In the second, all data stays
on the data owners’ devices, but they actively participate in the
information extraction procedure.
Releasing the data. Information about individuals can be hidden
by perturbing the data randomly, as applied in learning decision
trees [3] and other settings [10, 12]. The notion of k-anonymity
[32] requires each record to be indistinguishable from at least k − 1
other records, which can be achieved by suppressing or generalizing
certain attributes. Its shortcomings in terms of privacy have been
addressed by l-diversity [22], which has further been refined to
t-closeness [18].
Keeping the data. A recently proposed solution for training ma-
chine learningmodels on distributed data is called federated learning
(FL) [24]: a server distributes the current version of the model to the
data-owning clients, which then return only updates to this model,
rather than their raw data. While FL’s original focus was not on
privacy, algorithms for extending it in this direction have been pro-
posed [13, 25]. These extensions build on techniques due to Abadi
et al. [2], by randomly sampling a subset of users that should partic-
ipate in a training round, and adding random noise to their updates.
In this setting, a client’s private data is not to be protected against
a malicious server (the server is assumed to be trusted), but rather
against other clients participating in the training. FL extensions that
come closer to our setting are based on local differential privacy
(LDP) [20, 36]. Here, noise is added to the model updates sent by
the users to prevent them from leaking sensitive information. The
mathematical guarantee provided by these methods is based on
the widely accepted differential privacy, but it comes at the cost of
significantly reducing the classification performance of the models.
Even when reducing the required amount of noise by sending only
one dimension of each user’s model update per training iteration
[20], the reported increase in misclassification rate as compared to
non-private training can be larger than 0.2 for an SVM. The same
holds for combining LDP with threshold homomorphic encryption
[36], where the F1-score of the trained SVM drops by more than
0.1. As we show in our experiments (Sec. 5), the performance drop
when using SecVM is negligible. In addition, the aforementioned
method based on threshold homomorphic encryption [36] as well
as other solutions based on cryptography [6] require a trusted pub-
lic key infrastructure, whereas SecVM can be used with any readily
available anonymization network such as TOR (see Sec. 4).
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the problem of training a linear SVM on distributed
data, i.e., the data is spread among multiple Internet-connected
client devices owned by individual parties. Each client i’s dataset
consists of a feature vector xi and a label yi . For reasons that will
become clear later, we assume that features take on integer values,
which they do, e.g., if they represent counts. In addition to the
clients, there is a separate party, the server owner, who would
like to use the data for training a classification model. While this
intention is supported by the clients, they do not want the server
to learn anything about individual clients.
Why do we say “anything” above, when in fact we only want
to protect sensitive client information? First off, the server should
certainly never know the complete feature vector together with
the label. However, the feature vector alone, or a part of it, could
already contain sensitive information: if only a subset of the features
suffices to identify a user, then the other features contain additional
(potentially sensitive) information. Likewise, if a single feature is
unique to a certain user, the feature–label combination gives away
their label. And finally, a single feature alone can already contain
sensitive information, e.g., if features are strings users type into a
text box.We therefore formalize our privacy requirement as follows:
Privacy requirement. The server must not be able to
infer the label or any feature value for any individual
client.
Server capabilities. In order to infer user information, we assume
amalicious server can (1) observe incoming traffic, (2) send arbitrary
data to clients, and (3) control an arbitrarily large fraction of the
clients by introducing forged clients.
4 PROPOSED SOLUTION
The loss function of a binary classification model often takes the
form
J (w) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
L(w,xi ,yi ) + λR(w), (1)
where N is the number of training samples (in our case, users),
xi ∈ Rd user i’s (in our case, integer) feature vector, yi ∈ {−1, 1}
user i’s label,w ∈ Rd the parameter vector of the model, L the loss
for an individual sample, R a regularization function independent
of the data, and λ > 0 the regularization parameter. When using a
subgradient method to train the model, the update for dimension j
becomes
w j ← w j − η
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂L(w,xi ,yi )
∂w j
+ λ
∂R(w)
∂w j
)
, (2)
where η > 0 is the learning-rate parameter. In the case of linear
SVMs, we have L(w,xi ,yi ) = max{0, 1 − yiwT xi } and
∂L(w,xi ,yi )
∂w j
= δ (1 − yiwT xi )yixi j , (3)
where δ (x) = 1 if x > 0, and δ (x) = 0 otherwise.
The key observation that federated learning [24] and also our
method rely on is that the update of Eq. 2 is the sum over values
that each only depend on the data of a single user i . To train the
model, we follow a process akin to federated learning:
(1) The server sends out the current modelw to the clients.
(2) Each client i computes its local update ∇wL(w,xi ,yi ) and
sends it back to the server.
(3) The server sums up the individual updates, computes∇wR(w),
and makes an update to the model.
To meet our privacy requirements, we adopt a slightly more nu-
anced protocol, described next. To begin with, we will work un-
der the following temporary assumptions, which will later be
dropped to accommodate real-world settings:
A1. There is a trusted third party that first collects the update
data (as specified below) from the clients in every training
iteration and then sends it as a single database to the server.
A2. The server honestly follows the above three-step training
procedure, which essentially means that the server sends the
same correctly updated weight vector to all clients.
We also assume that the client code is available for inspection
by the users to make sure the clients follow the proposed protocol.
The server code, however, need not be public, since SecVM protects
against a malicious server.
Hiding feature values from the server: hashing. We do not
want the server to learn any feature values. For this purpose, we
make features less specific by grouping them via hashing. Assume
we have d different features, i.e.,w ∈ Rd . We then choose a number
1 < k < d and reduce w’s dimension to d˜ := ⌊d/k⌋ by applying a
hash function to each feature index and taking the result modulo d˜
as its new index (its bin). If several features of a user hash into one
bin, their values are added. In expectation, this results in at least k
features, indistinguishable from each other, per bin.
Usually, hashing is used to reduce the problem dimensionality,
and thereby resource consumption, and collisions are a necessary
but unwanted side effect, as they may decrease model accuracy
[34]. For us, on the contrary, a high number of collisions is de-
sired, since it implies an increase in privacy: k features hashing to
the same bin implies that we cannot distinguish between those k
features. Lemmata A.1 and A.2 show that non-colliding features,
which would undermine privacy, are highly unlikely. We can, e.g.,
guarantee a high minimum number of collisions for each feature
with overwhelming probability.
A malicious server could try to choose the hash function in
such a way that certain features do not collide and can thus be
distinguished. This can, however, easily be prevented by letting
the hash depend on a trusted unpredictable random value, as, e.g.,
provided by NIST [30].
To see why we want to hide feature values from the server,
consider, e.g., the case where the features are the frequencies with
which strings occur in a text field into which a user types text: here,
the feature itself could already reveal sensitive information, such as
email addresses. Features could also help determine a user’s label:
if, e.g., each feature denotes whether or not a specific URL has been
visited by the user, then the server could infer the label of the sole
visitor i of URL j (e.g., for the URL http://github.com/User123, the
sole visitor is most likely User123 themselves), by the corresponding
update vector entry δ (1 − yiwT xi )yixi j = yi .
Hiding labels from the server: splitting update vectors. In
addition to keeping the features private, we also want to prevent
the server from knowing the label of a user. Recall that, during
training, only the update vector ∇wL(w,xi ,yi ) (and not the label
yi ) is sent to the server. Nonetheless, in the case of a linear SVM
with binary features, if one of the entries δ (1 − yiwT xi )yixi j of
the update vector is non-zero, then that very entry equals—and
thus reveals—the label. If (and only if) the server knew to which
user the update vector belongs, it would know this user’s label.
Since by temporary assumption A1, the server is given the update
vectors only, it would have to identify the user via the update
vector, which we must hence prevent. To do so, we use a property
of the subgradient update (Eq. 2): not only is one user’s local update
independent of the other users’, but also the update for one entryw j
does not rely on the update for any other entries, which means we
can update each entry individually. We exploit this fact by splitting
the update vector ∇wL(w,xi ,yi ) into its individual entries and
sending each entry δ (1 −yiwT xi )yixi j together with its index j as
a separate package. In the case of binary xi j , δ (1−yiwT xi )yixi j can
only take on the values −1, 0 and 1, therefore making it impossible
for the server to determine which packages stem from the same
feature vector, since they cannot be discerned from other clients’
packages. The case of binary features can easily be extended to
integer features: instead of sending one package containing yixi j ,
the client may send |xi j | packages containing yi sgn(xi j ). (Note
that packages where δ (1 − yiwT xi ) = 0 need not be sent.)
Since, after this change to the protocol, the server only receives
packages containing 1 or −1 and the respective feature index, this is
equivalent to knowing the number N+j of positive packages and the
number N−j of negative packages received for each feature index
j. As mentioned before, δ (1 − yiwT xi )yixi j ∈ {0,yi }, i.e., only
users with label 1 contribute to N+j and only users with label −1
contribute to N−j . Determining the label of a user is thus equivalent
to determining whether the user’s update vector contributed to N+j
or toN−j . The confidence with which this can be done is vanishingly
small, as we show in Lemma A.3, even for the (from a privacy
perspective worst) case that the server knows all of a user’s features
from some external source (the maximum a server that does not
already know the label could possibly know).
Dropping temporary assumptionA1.We now drop the assump-
tion that the server receives the update data as a single database. In
the new setting, the server additionally receives (1) the IP address
from which a package was sent and (2) the time at which a package
arrives. We need to make this information useless in order for the
privacy guarantees from above to still hold, as follows. First, we
route all messages through an anonymity network, such as Tor
[35], or through a similar proxy server infrastructure, such as the
one we use in our online experiment (Sec. 6), thereby removing
all information that was originally carried by the IP address. With-
out this measure, the server could directly link all packages to the
client that sent them, thus effectively undoing the above-described
splitting of feature vectors. Second, to remove information that the
arrival times of packages might contain, we set the length of one
training iteration to n seconds and make clients send their packages
not all at once, but spread them randomly over the n seconds, thus
making the packages’ arrival times useless for attacks. Without
this measure, all update packages from the same user might be
sent right after one another, and the server would receive groups
of packages with larger breaks after each group and could thus
assume that each such group contains all packages from exactly
one user.
Dropping temporary assumption A2. Finally, we drop the as-
sumption that the server honestly follows the training procedure by
sending the same correctly updated weight vector to all clients in
each iteration. In order to not depend on this assumption, we give
clients a way to recognize when the server violates it: Instead of
requesting the training data in an iteration once from the server, the
clients request it multiple times. Only if they get the same response
every time do they respond; otherwise they must assume an attack.
Since the clients’ requests are routed through an anonymization
network, the server cannot identify subsequent request from the
same client and cannot maliciously send the same spurious weight
vector every time. To reduce communication costs, the clients don’t
actually request the training data multiple times, but only once
in the beginning, and afterwards request hashes of it. As an even
safer countermeasure, one could distribute weight vectors and all
auxiliary information via a blockchain. This way, each user would
be able to verify the integrity of the data they receive.
In the case that one does not prevent the server from distributing
different data to different clients, the server could, e.g., distribute
an all-zero weight vectorw = 0 ∈ Rd˜ to all users in a first step. All
of them would then respond with a non-zero update revealing all of
their non-zero features, since then 1 − yiwT xi = 1 for arbitrary yi
and xi . In the next step, the server would send out the zero weight
vector to all but one user ℓ. This user would instead receive the
weight vector e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0). If yℓxℓ1 ≤ −1, then user ℓ would in
this round not send back any updates. Otherwise the server would
do the same with −e1, then with e2, −e2, and so on, until it receives
fewer updates than in the last iteration. It would then know that all
the missing updates come from one user, and would thus be able
to reconstruct this user’s label and feature vector (however, still
hashed). In a similar fashion, the server could undermine single
users’ privacy by manipulating the time they have for sending their
updates, i.e., the length of the training iteration. All users would
get a very long deadline, and one user ℓ a very short one. Then the
packages arriving before the short deadline would mostly come
from user ℓ.
SecVM:model andprotocol.To conclude, we summarize the final
SecVMmodel. As an initial step, all clients hash their feature vectors
into a lower-dimensional space. Then the training procedure begins.
The server sends out the current parameter vectorw to all clients.
Each client i computes its local update дi := ∇wL(w,xi ,yi ) =
δ (1 − yiwT xi )yixi and splits this vector into its individual entries
дi j . These entries, together with their indices j, are sent back to
the server as individual packages at random points in time via a
proxy network. The server sums up the updates дi j corresponding
to the same entry j of the parameter vector and updates the weight
vectorw accordingly. This procedure is repeated until the parameter
vector has converged. This model meets the privacy requirement
from Sec. 3, as it does so under temporary assumptions A1 and A2,
and, as we have shown, we may drop these assumptions without
violating the privacy requirement.
5 OFFLINE EVALUATION: GENDER
INFERENCE FOR TWITTER USERS
We implemented and tested our approach in a real application with
users connected via the Internet, as described in Sec. 6. However,
to assess its feasibility and to determine suitable hyperparameters,
we first worked with offline data. An and Weber [4] generously
provided us with a dataset containing tweets collected from nearly
350,000 Twitter users alongside demographic data inferred from
the users’ profiles. Around half of the users are labeled as male, and
half of them as female.
As the classification task for the SVM, we decided to predict the
gender of users from the words they used in their tweets. The fea-
ture space is therefore very high-dimensional; after preprocessing,
we obtained 96M distinct words. On the other hand, the feature
vectors are very sparse, with only 1,826 words per user on average.
The properties of the dataset and the classification task are very
similar to what we would expect to encounter in our later online
experiment, so we deemed this a good initial evaluation of our
method.
We only compare SecVM — using different levels of hashing —
with a vanilla SVM that doesn’t use hashing, and not with other
classification methods (logistic regression, neural networks etc.).
This is due to the fact that their typically real-valued gradient en-
tries may reveal private information, which makes those methods
unsuited for fulfilling our privacy requirement (see also Sec. 7).
Therefore the choice is not between training an SVM or training a
different classifier, but rather between training an SVM or not being
able to train a classifier at all due to the privacy constraints. Or,
to put it differently: our goal is not to achieve a classification per-
formance that can compete with non-privacy-preserving methods,
but to learn a useful classifier in our restricted setting.
Methodology. For subgradient methods, one has to decide on a
step size η. We chose the step size of the Pegasos algorithm [33], i.e.,
η = 1/λt , where t is the current iteration and λ the regularization
parameter; but whereas Pegasos performs stochastic subgradient
training, we used regular subgradient training, where all training
samples, rather than a subset, are used to compute each update.
For training and testing an unhashed SVM, we first split the
dataset into two equally large sets A and B, and each of those sets
into 90% training and 10% test data. Then we trained an SVM with
different values of λ onA’s training set, chose the one with the best
accuracy on A’s test set, and did another round of training on B’s
training set with this λ.
Results. Fig. 1a reports the performance of this second SVM on
B’s test set. Choosing any λ between 10−7 and 10−2 only made a
marginal difference in accuracy. The subgradient method is not a
descent algorithm, i.e., it does not decrease the value of the objective
function in each step. The effect of this can be seen in the blue
curve of Fig. 1a: test accuracy fluctuates a lot. Therefore, inspired
by Corollary 1 of the Pegasos paper [33], we averaged the weight
vector of subsequent iterations and investigated how the number
of averaged weight vectors affects test performance. Fig. 1a shows
that averaging only two weight vectors already gives not only an
almost monotonic learning curve, but also a prediction accuracy
strictly above that achieved when not using averaging. For the
following results, we thus always averaged two subsequent weight
vectors, as averaging more vectors only led to slower convergence.
We obtained an accuracy of 75.2% on the original, unhashed data.
To evaluate the influence of hashing on accuracy, we did 141
random splits of the entire dataset into 90% training and 10% test,
with fixed λ = 10−4. Fig. 1b shows means and standard deviations
of the fraction of correctly predicted labels for different numbers
of hash bins. For instance, when reducing the dimension of the
original feature and weight vectors by a factor of 1,000 (i.e., hashing
the 96M original features into 96K bins), accuracy only drops from
75.2% to 74.7%, showing that even very aggressive hashing has only
a negligible impact on the SVM’s performance.
6 ONLINE EVALUATION: GENDER
INFERENCE FORWEB SURFERS
In addition to the above offline evaluation (Sec. 5), we also tested our
method in its intended environment: as part of a software that runs
on user-held, Internet-connected devices, in this case the Cliqz web
browser [1]. Via a collaboration, we deployed SecVM to a sample
of Cliqz’s user base of more than 200K daily active users. For data
collection, Cliqz uses the idea of client- instead of server-side data
aggregation via a framework called Human Web and based on a
proxy network [26, 27]. The work presented in this paper leverages
some of the concepts introduced by this framework; but SecVM
goes one step further and not only does data aggregation on the
client side, but also computations on this data.
Task. As in the offline evaluation (Sec. 5), we decided to build
an SVM that can predict a user’s gender, but this time not from
the words they type, but rather from the words contained in the
titles of the websites they have visited. This setting is much more
challenging than the one of Sec. 5: users go on- and offline at
unpredictable points in time, the number of available users varies
heavily between the different times of day, and together with the
set of training users, the set of test users changes, too, thus giving
less accurate assessments of prediction performance.
Implementation.1 We implemented the client side as a module
in the Cliqz browser. It extracts the features (words contained in
website titles) from a user’s history, and the label (gender) from the
HTML code of www.facebook.com once a user visits that page and
logs in. The clients regularly fetch a static file from a server that
describes the experiments that are currently running: the number
of features to be used, the current weight vector, etc. Apart from
this, it contains the percentage p of users that should participate in
training, while the others are used for testing. The first time a user
encounters a new experiment, they assign themselves to training
with probability p, and to test with probability 1 − p (we chose
p = 0.7). The file fetched from the server also informs the user
how much time they have left until the end of the current training
iteration to send their data back to the server. This data consists
either of the update packages or a single test package, depending
on whether the user is part of the training or the test set. To avoid
temporal correlation attacks, each package is sent at a random point
1Source code for client available at https://github.com/cliqz-oss/browser-core/tree/
6945afff7be667ed74b0b7476195678262120baf/modules/secvm/sources. Source code for
server available at https://github.com/epfl-dlab/secvm-server.
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Figure 1: Offline evaluation on Twitter gender prediction task (Sec. 5).
in time between its creation and the end of the training iteration.
IP addresses are hidden from the server by routing the packages
through the Human Web proxy network, [26], a system that is
functionally similar to Tor and prevents identification of users at
the network level.2
Results.We performed two runs of the experiment, one for three
days during night- and daytime (Fig. 2a), and one for two days only
during daytime (Fig. 2b). As parameters, we chose λ = 0.1 as the
regularization parameter, 10,000 bins for feature hashing, and, as in
the offline experiment on the Twitter dataset (Sec. 5), averaged two
subsequent weight vectors. As can be seen in Fig. 3, there were a
lot fewer females in the user base, which is why we weighed their
updates by a factor of 4. We set each training iteration to last 11
minutes, in order to minimize the load on the client side.
In each iteration, we let the users from the test set evaluate
the current model. We evaluate performance in terms of recall
for males and females, i.e., the fraction of all males and females,
respectively, that the classifier predicts correctly. Results are shown
in Fig. 2a–b. The dark solid lines show recall for female and male
users, respectively, the transparent lines their respective share in the
test set. This share is equal to the recall that would be achieved by
a baseline classifier randomly guessing each class with its marginal
probability (i.e., between 10% and 20% for females, depending on
the iteration number, and between 80% and 90% for males). We
see that recall for males is at around the same (high) level as the
baseline, while recall for females (the minority class) lies far above
this baseline. However, despite the weighting, recall for females is
still significantly worse than recall for males. We attribute this to
the fact that the number of training samples was much smaller for
this class.
2The technical report describing the Cliqz Human Web [26] contains a discussion on
why TOR was not suitable for the Cliqz use case.
Noteworthy are the drops for females and spikes for males
around iterations 150 and 300 of the continuous training (Fig. 2a).
They coincide with nighttime and a drop in overall active users, as
shown in Fig. 3. At night, the share of female users in the overall
population drops to about half, compared to daytime (10% vs. 20%),
and we explain the low female recall during those times by the fact
that we see very little training signal for females then. Hence, one
would preferably stop training during the night, which we did in
our second run, whose results (Fig. 2b) are much more stable.
Besides recall, we also evaluated precision. It lies far above the
baseline for both females and males (Fig. 2c–d).
7 DISCUSSION
Other models beyond SVM. Linear SVMs are among the most
popular classification algorithms in research as well as the industry
across domains [7, 17, 19, 23, 37, 39]. Their popularity is, however,
not the only reason why we chose SVMs as the machine learning
model underlying our framework. The SVM model also has the
attractive property that the partial derivatives of the user-dependent
part of its loss function can only take on the values −1, 0, and 1,
which we exploit to make the reconstruction of labels impossible. To
illustrate this advantage, consider what would happen when using,
e.g., logistic regression instead. In this case, we have L(w,xi ,yi ) =
log(1 + exp(−yiwT xi )) and
∂L(w,xi ,yi )
∂w j
=
yixi j
1 + exp(yiwT xi )
. (4)
When all feature values are integers, the numerator of Eq. 4 can
only take on integer values, allowing the real-valued denominator
to uniquely identify user i , thus making it easy to associate updates
from user i for different values of j with each other, even when
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Figure 2: Online evaluation on task of predicting web
surfers’ gender (Sec. 6). We chose to perform one update ev-
ery 11 minutes, so 50 updates took about 9 hours.
splitting update vectors into their individual components, as intro-
duced in Sec. 4 precisely as a counter-measure against such record
linkage. However, we point out that rectifiers—the same function
as the SVM loss—are a popular choice as an activation function for
neural networks [14], and there is also research on using binary
weights in neural networks [8]. Both of these observations open
avenues to extend our work to neural networks.
Practical considerations. As opposed to federated learning [24],
we split the updates from individual users into atomic pieces. Only
this allows us to obtain such strong privacy guarantees; but, of
course, it comes at the expense of efficiency: due to protocol over-
head, sending many small packages instead of one big package
produces more traffic both on the client and on the server side,
which in turn slows down training, especially if one has no control
over the client devices and has to be conservative when estimating
the speed of their network connection in order not to congest it.
By applying our method in a real-world production setting (Sec. 6),
we showed that this overhead is very much manageable.
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Figure 3: Online evaluation (Sec. 6): absolute number of test
participants (30% of all participants) during the training
shown in Fig. 2a and 2c. Red: females. Blue: males. Green:
total.
As opposed to the privacy-focused extensions of federated learn-
ing [13, 25], SecVM works without adding random noise. Especially
when feature values are mostly small integers, such noise needs to
be large in order to achieve a sufficient level of privacy. Apart from
that, our goal is also a different one. The aforementioned methods
[13, 25] offer differential privacy guarantees against attacks that
aim at exploiting the differences between different iterations of the
machine learning model during the training process that could be
used by malicious clients to extract other clients’ data, whereas the
server is assumed to be trusted. SecVM, on the other hand, protects
against a malicious server.
Often the goal of privacy research in the field of machine learn-
ing is to prevent the extraction of sensitive information from the
final model. Our approach starts even earlier, by preventing the ex-
traction of sensitive information during the training. Of course the
model itself that results from such a training procedure preserves
the privacy of the training data as well.
Limitations. First, we would like to emphasize that for our privacy
guarantees to hold, the client module source code must be visible
to the clients, as is the case for our experiment in Sec. 6.
There are two cases in which SecVM can fail to protect privacy.
The first one is when being unlucky with the hashing function.
When a sensitive feature does not get hashed into the same bin as
any other feature, then the server will learn about the presence of
this feature. However, the probability of this happening is crypto-
graphically small, as we show in Appendix A.1. The second case in
which SecVM’s privacy protection fails is when being unlucky with
the data. If all gradients except from a single one are zero, which
implies that the SVM manages to correctly classify all training sam-
ples except from this single one, and additionally the l1-norm of all
feature vectors is the same, then the server knows that all messages
it receives stem from the same user — the same holds true if only
a single user participates in the training. If the server knows the
feature values of this user from some other source, it will be able
to reconstruct the user’s label from the sign of the received mes-
sages. But due to the hashing, it will not be able to reconstruct any
features. Note also that the event that an SVM achieves an almost
perfect classification accuracy is unlikely on real-world datasets
due to the limited model complexity.
A different attack vector is via weaknesses of anonymization
networks, but this is outside of the scope of this paper; as well as ma-
licious clients trying to poison the training by sending manipulated
gradients.
The datasets that we experimented with are only high-dimen-
sional datasets. On these datasets, the hashing method is partic-
ularly useful, because it doubles as a method for dimensionality
reduction. On small-dimensional datasets, hashing might reduce
the dimension to a value so small that the SVM’s classification per-
formance drops significantly. However, on typical low-dimensional
datasets (think of, e.g., demographic data), hashing will not even
be necessary, because every feature is non-zero for a large number
of users and thus no single feature is identifying.
8 CONCLUSION
We proposed SecVM, a framework for training an SVM on an un-
trusted server based on distributed data while preserving the data
owners’ privacy, without the need for direct access to their data.
Instead, data owners only send model updates to the training server.
The system relies on three main ideas to prevent the reconstruction
of sensitive information from those updates: routing all messages
through a proxy network, splitting the update vector into its com-
ponents, and hashing the original features. We implemented SecVM
in the Cliqz browser—a real distributed system—with promising
results.
A PRIVACY GUARANTEES
A.1 Hashing
Notation 1. Letm denote the number of unique features and n the
number of bins we hash them into. The hashing is executed by a
function h drawn uniformly at random from the family of all hash
functions from the set of strings to [n], where by [n] we denote the set
{1, . . . ,n}. Probabilities are taken over the random choice of h.
We give bounds on 3 probabilities that all can be used to deter-
mine the number of hash bins to use for a desired level of privacy.
Lemma A.1. (a) Let p1 be the probability that there exists at
least one feature which does not collide with any other feature.
Then
p1 ≤ m
(
n − 1
n
)m−1
.
(b) Let K ⊆ [m] be a set of specific features, k := |K |. For the
probability p2 that at least one of the features in K does not
collide with any other feature we have that
p2 ≤ k
(
n − 1
n
)m−1
.
Proof. (a) Using a union bound in the first step, we get
p1 ≤
n∑
i=1
Pr[exactly one features hashes into bin i]
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
1
n
(
n − 1
n
)m−1
=m
(
n − 1
n
)m−1
.
In the second line we summed over the probabilities for a
specific one of them features to end up in bin i .
(b) The statement again follows from a union bound argument:
p2 ≤
∑
i ∈K
Pr[feature k does not collide]
= k
(
n − 1
n
)m−1
□
Lemma A.2. Let p3 be the probability that each feature collides
with at least k − 1 other features. Assume that k ≤ m/n (otherwise
p3 = 0). Then
p3 ≥ 1 −
(
m
k − 1
) (n − 1)m−k+1
nm−1
m − k + 2
m − nk + n + 1 .
Proof. Note first that
p3 ≥ Pr[at least k features per bin]
= 1 − Pr[at least one bin with less than k features],
since we exclude the possibility of having empty bins. Then by a
union bound
1 − Pr[at least one bin with less than k features]
≥ 1 −
n∑
i=1
Pr[< k features in bin i]
= 1 −
n∑
i=1
k−1∑
l=0
Pr[exactly l features in bin i]
= 1 −
n∑
i=1
k−1∑
l=0
∑
J ⊆[m]
| J |=l
Pr[exactly the features in J in bin i]
= 1 −
n∑
i=1
k−1∑
l=0
∑
J ⊆[m]
| J |=l
(
1
n
)l (n − 1
n
)m−l
= 1 −
n∑
i=1
k−1∑
l=0
(
m
l
) (n − 1)m−l
nm
= 1 − n
k−1∑
l=0
(
m
l
) (n − 1)m−l
nm
= 1 − n
(
n − 1
n
)m k−1∑
l=0
(
m
l
) (
1
n − 1
)l
.
To bound the sum, we adapt a proof of [21]. We observe that( m
k−1
) ( 1
n−1
)k−1
+
( m
k−2
) ( 1
n−1
)k−2
+
( m
k−3
) ( 1
n−1
)k−3
+ . . .( m
k−1
) ( 1
n−1
)k−1
= 1 + (n − 1) k − 1
m − k + 2
+ (n − 1)2 (k − 1)(k − 2)(m − k + 2)(m − k + 3) + . . . ,
which can be bounded from above by the geometric series
1 + (n − 1) k − 1
m − k + 2 +
(
(n − 1) k − 1
m − k + 2
)2
+ . . .
=
∞∑
l=0
(
(n − 1) k − 1
m − k + 2
)l
=
m − k + 2
m − nk + n + 1 .
The series converges because k ≤ m/n. This calculation yields
1 − n
(
n − 1
n
)m k−1∑
l=0
(
m
l
) (
1
n − 1
)l
≥ 1 − n
(
n − 1
n
)m ( m
k − 1
) (
1
n − 1
)k−1 m − k + 2
m − nk + n + 1
= 1 −
(
m
k − 1
) (n − 1)m−k+1
nm−1
m − k + 2
m − nk + n + 1 .
□
To get some intuition for these quantities, we give an example.
In the Twitter experiment in Sec. 5 withm = 95, 880, 008 we saw
no significant decrease in prediction accuracy for n = 95, 880. For
these values, we get p1 < 5 × 10−427 and p2 < 6k × 10−435. The k
in Lemma A.2 can be chosen between 1 and 1,000. For k = 700, we
have 1 − p3 < 5 × 10−19.
In [34] it was proved that hashing each feature into multiple bins
can increase the probability that for each feature there exists at least
one bin where it does not collide with any other feature. Of course
this only holds if the number of bins is higher than the number
of features; also we don’t want features that have no collisions.
Nevertheless, this is an interesting option even in our case. Assume
that the number of features is higher than the number of bins, but
that many of them are not very indicative of the label we are trying
to predict. Thus we are only interested in preventing collisions
between indicative features. If we set n in Theorem 1 of [34] to
be the number of indicative features, we obtain a bound for their
non-collision probability if we hash all features into multiple bins.
In our experiments in Sec. 5 and Sec. 6 we are in a situation where
most features are not very indicative — however, increasing the
number of bins each feature is hashed into slightly decreased the
accuracy instead of increasing it.
A.2 Splitting
As shown in Sec. 4 of the paper, determining whether a user’s label
is 1 (-1) is equivalent to determining whether they have contributed
to the sum of positive (negative) update vectors. For this task, we
allow the server the maximal knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of
the entire feature vector, which equals the update vector up to
multiplication with -1, 0 or 1.
We formalize the task of the server as the discrimination between
two worlds. In world 1, the vectors of all users are random. In world
2, the vectors of all users except from the one to be attacked are
random; the vector of the latter one is known to the server.
Lemma A.3. Let uj denote the j-th entry of a vector u ∈ Nd . Let
M > 1 be the number of users participating in the training, d > 0 the
dimension of the update vectors and F > 0 the (fixed) ℓ1-norm of the
update vectors. The model is trained for K > 0 iterations.
Let Xmkf ∼ U (u ∈ Nd≥0 : There exists exactly one j∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,d}
s.t. uj∗ = 1 and uj = 0 for all j , j ′) be i.i.d. random vectors fol-
lowing the uniform distribution over all one-hot vectors, wherem ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, f ∈ {1, . . . , F }. The update vector of
them-th user in iteration k is then given by Xmk :=
∑F
f =1 X
mkf .
(Here we assume positive updates; the case of negative updates is
analogous.) Let vk ≥ 0, ∥v ∥1 = F , be the (possible) update vector
in the k-th training iteration of the user to be attacked. Further let
sk ∈ Nd≥0, ∥sk ∥1 = MF , be the sum that the server receives in the
k-th iteration. Then
| Pr[
M∑
m=1
Xmk = sk for all k = 1 . . .K]
− Pr[
M−1∑
m=1
Xmk +vk = sk for all k = 1 . . .K]|
≤max{p(M, F ,d), p(M − 1, F ,d)}K ,
where
p(m, f ,d) = (mf )!(
⌊mfd ⌋!
)d 1dmf .
Proof. We show that both probabilities are bounded by the r.h.s.
and then use that |a − b | ≤ max{a, b} for non-negative a and b.
Pr[
M∑
m=1
Xmk = sk for all k = 1 . . .K]
= Pr[
M∑
m=1
Xm1 = s1]K
= Pr[
M,F∑
m=1,f =1
Xm1f = s1]K
= Pr[
M,F∑
m=1,f =1
X
m1f
i = s
1
i for all i = 1 . . .d]K
=
((
MF
s11 , . . . , s
1
d
)
1
dMF
)K
≤ ©­­«
(MF )!(
⌊MFd ⌋!
)d 1dMF ª®®¬
k
= p(M, F ,d)K
For the second probability we similarly obtain
Pr[
M−1∑
m=1
Xmk +vk = sk for all k = 1 . . .K]
=
(( (M − 1)F
s11 −v11 , . . . , s1d −v1d
)
1
d(M−1)F
)K
≤ p(M − 1, F ,d)K ,
where we tacitly assumed that ski −vki ≥ 0 for all i and k ; otherwise
Pr[
M−1∑
m=1
Xmk +vk = sk for all k = 1 . . .K] = 0.
□
In the lemma we assume that all user have the same amount
of features (as is the case in our online experiment). However, we
only use this for simplifying the notation; one can also do without
this assumption and get a corresponding bound. One simply has to
replace MF by the total number of features and (M − 1)F by this
number minus ∥v ∥1 in the probability bounds.
TakingM = 34, 615, F = 1826, d = 95, 880 — the numbers from
the Twitter experiment if we pretend to have the same number
of features for each user and assume that 10% of the users send a
positive update —, the lemma gives a bound of < 5 × 10−173411.
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